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1 Introduction 
During the 1990's, the population of Latinos in California has grown considerably. At the 
beginning of this decade, the statewide population of Latinos was 7.8 million - but by 1996, 
the number of Latinos in California had grown to over 9 million.1 Thus, California currently 
contains at least one-third of the Latino population in the United States. According to the 
estimates of the California Department of Finance, this growth in the Latino population in 
California will continue for the forseeable future. 
Latinos will eventually become the largest racial or ethnic group in California. Con­
trary to popular beliefs about the citizenship status of the new Latinos in California, the 
vast majority of the increased Latino population in California comes from births, not im-
migration, thus implying that if these new residents stay in California, they will soon be 
eligible to register and vote. 
These demographic trends have sparked a great deal of discussion in the press about 
the political impact of this enormous increase in California's Latino population. Many of 
the pundits and political elite have argued that with the demographic increases in Latino 
population will inevitably come increases in Latino political power. But the fact that many 
of the important issues debated in the state capital and passed by the electorate in the ballot 
box are not issues supported by a majority of the Latino population (Propositions 187, 209, 
and 227) seems to provide strong evidence to counter the claim that Latino political power 
has yet arrived. 
In fact, the recent research literature has been much more pessimistic about how 
1 In general we will use the terminology "Latino" whenever possible, meaning California citizens of Latino 
or Hispanic descent. Unfortunately there is a lack of uniformity in the use of these terms, both by govern­
ment agencies which are entrusted with collecting statistics on racial and ethnic groups and by the various 
organizations who conduct public opinion or exit polling surveys of California citizens and voters. When­
ever we deviate from our general terminology we will be specific in whether we are discussing self-identified 
Latino, Hispanic, or Latino-Hispanic voters or citizens. 
quickly and easily Latino population growth will translate into political power for Latinos 
(Alvarez and Butterfield 1998, 1999; de la Garza 1996; de la Garza and DeSipio 1992; 
de la Garza, Menchaca and DeSipio 1994; de la Garza and DeSipio 1996; DeSipio 1996; 
Nelson 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Uhlaner 1996). The emerging picture of 
Latino political behavior is one which documents an enormous amount of heterogeneity and 
complexity of opinions, attitudes and behavior, making clear generalizations about the future 
direction of Latino political power in California and the United States problematic. 
First, Latinos tend to participate in politics at a much lower rate than whites and 
African-Americans. Early research, for example, showed that only 60% of eligible Latinos 
in California voted in 1984, compared to 76% of eligible white Californians (Uhlaner, Cain 
and Kiewiet 1989) . Other more recent studies have come to similar conclusions (de la Garza 
1996; Uhlaner 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) . But more current evidence from 
California seems to indicate that Latinos are narrowing the participation gap (Alvarez and 
Butterfield 1998, 1999) . 
Second, when we turn to attitudes and opinions of Latinos, the picture clouds con­
siderably. Part of the problem with the cloudy picture is a methodological problem. Until 
quite recently, studies of Latino political attitudes and opinions were usually conducted us­
ing survey samples which were not very representative of Latino populations (for further 
discussion of this issue see de la Garza 1987; de la Garza et al. 1992; DeSipio 1996) . But, 
on the other hand, some of the more recent survey studies of Latino political attitudes and 
opinions have relied upon oversampling of Latinos, which then make comparisons to other 
racial and ethnic groups difficult (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). 
But, there are some clear tendencies in Latino political attitudes and opinion which 
have become apparent from this convoluted literature. One tendency is that Latinos do 
strongly lean towards the Democratic party in their partisan attachments (DeSipio 1996) . 
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While Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have shown strong Democratic partisanship 
(Cain and Kiewiet 1987) , Cuban Americans have shown strong Republican partisanship 
(Moreno and Rae 1992; Moreno and Warren 1992) . A second tendency is to find in national 
samples of Latinos a tendency towards conservative ideological attitudes (de la Garza et al. 
1992) . A third tendency is for Latinos, despite these conservative leanings, to be strongly 
supportive of social policies (like fighting crime and stopping drug use) and of further gov­
ernmental action in domestic policy (de la Garza et al. 1992) . On the other hand, Latinos 
tend to take positions in line with their general ideological stands when it comes to issues 
like abortion and capital punishment. Thus, despite the general partisan and ideological 
tendencies of Latinos, the issue stands of Latinos are not consistent with standard partisan 
or ideological cleavages in the United States. 
Our purpose in this paper is to trace the changes during the 1990's in Latino political 
behavior in California. Before we can claim to understand any changes in Latino political 
representation, whether in local or state politics, we need to document if the demographic 
changes in the Latino participation are translating into greater participation by Latinos in 
the political process and changes in Latino voter attitudes, preferences, and voting behavior. 
Despite the political rhetoric surrounding the discussions of Latino political behavior in the 
1990's, it is surprising to find little in the recent academic literature about this important 
political question. We hope to provide some empirical evidence to document recent trends 
in Latino political behavior in California, and in future work discuss more completely what 
these behavioral changes might imply for Latino political representation in California. 
Below, we produce three important findings about Latinos in recent California elec­
toral politics. First, there are strong signs that Latinos are registering and participating in 
California politics in greater proportions, indicating that Latinos are mobilizing. What is 
unclear at this point is what the exact determinants of this Latino mobilization have been, 
and what factors might produce further Latino mobilization in coming elections. Second, 
3 
during the 1990's there was widespread support by Latinos for the Democratic party, both in 
terms of partisan affiliation and voting behavior in gubernatorial elections. Third, the issue 
opinions of Latino voters, though, are quite distinct from those of other racial and ethnic 
groups in California; Latino issue opinions are quite difficult to reconcile with the current 
issue platforms of both major political parties. That Latino voters have issue opinions which 
are different from other racial and ethnic groups, and which do not conform simply with 
the current partisan cleavages, makes simple predictions about the future of Latino political 
power in California quite difficult. 
2 Latino Registration and Participation 
We begin by examining the trends between 1990 and 1996 in Latino voter registration and 
turnout. The estimates we report in Table 1 come from a recent study conducted by Alvarez 
and Butterfield (1999) , in which Latino and Anglo voter registration and participation trends 
during this periods in each of California's 58 counties were estimated and discussed. Briefly, 
in that study the authors used data on each county's Latino and Anglo voting age populations 
in each election year, along with data on overall registration and turnout in each county, 
to produce "ecological estimates" of each racial or ethnic group's political registration and 
participation in each year using the ecological inference techniques recently developed by 
King (1997) . For a detailed discussion of these estimates or the estimation procedure, we 
refer interested readers to Alvarez and Butterfield (1998, 1999) and King (1997) . 
Table 1 appears here 
Table 1 is organized with the Latino voter registration estimates in the top panel, 
with each row giving the estimated proportion of the Latino voting-age population in each 
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geographic region of California who were registered to vote . In the top panel, we see that 
there were striking increases in Latino voter registration from 1990 to 1996. In 1990, before 
the waves of anti-Latino ballot initiatives began, Latino voter registration was estimated to 
be 523 of the voting-age Latino citizens of California. It increases slightly in 1992 and 1994, 
but jumps to 673 in 1996, an increase statewide of 153. When the Latino voter registration 
estimates are broken down for different regions of the state, two facts are apparent. First, 
the increases in Latino voter registration occurred throughout the state; in each region of 
California there were sharp increases in Latino voter registration. But, the second fact is 
that the increases did not occur at the same rate in the different regions of California. Some 
areas - like the Bay Area and the Central Coast - had estimated increases in Latino voter 
registration of over 203, with most of the increases occurring in the 1996 election cycle . 
Most of the rest of the regions of the state, though, had Latino voter registration increases 
roughly identical to the statewide changes during this period. 
In the bottom panel of Table 1 are the estimated proportions of eligible Latinos who 
turned out to participate in each of these four statewide elections in the 1990's . We see 
generally low levels of Latino participation in the 1990 election, ranging from around 253 to 
303. This is over 103 below statewide turnout of 413 in this election. The 1992 election, 
though, saw a rapid surge in Latino voter participation; this was most likely fueled by 
the Clinton presidential drive in California. In the 1992 election, statewide Latino voter 
participation increased by approximately 303 and was above the overall state turnout rate. 
The 1994 election, of course, witnessed the reelection drives of both Governor Pete 
Wilson and Senator Dianne Feinstein, as well as the divisive campaign over Proposition 
187. While Proposition 187 had no direct effect on citizens, it would have denied social 
services to illegal aliens. Many pundits have argued that the 1994 election campaigns of 
Pete Wilson, Michael Huffington, and surrounding Proposition 187, served to fuel sharp 
increases in Latino voter participation. But in Table 1 we see mixed support for this claim. 
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Relative to the 1990 midterm election, Latino voter participation was quite high statewide 
( 43% relative to 29% ) . But most of the increase in participation appears to occur between 
1990 and 1992. According to the estimates in Table 1, in 1992 Latino turnout was already 
equal to or greater than the overall turnout statewide. It is also between 1990 and 1992 
that the estimates reveal the large increase in Latino registration rates. Thus, the bulk of 
the increases in registration and turnout of Latinos in California occurred before the 1994 
election, which means that events in the 1994 election cannot explain most of the increases 
in turnout and registration in the early 1990's. 
However, the 1996 election had yet another presidential campaign and also had another 
socially divisive ballot proposition, the anti-affirmative action initiative known as Proposition 
209. In Table 1 we see evidence of substantial Latino voter mobilization from the 1994 
election, with Latino voter participation up to 52% statewide. However, much of this rise 
can be attributed to the on-year versus off-year comparison. Latino turnout rose 9% from 
1994 to 1996, but overall turnout was also up 7%. Yet again, even in the 1996 election cycle, 
the estimate for Latino voter participation in California is below the 1992 peak of 57%. 
Last, unlike the estimates for Latino voter registration trends from 1990 to 1996, there 
seems to be a great deal of uniformity across the different regions of California in Latino 
voter participation. The dynamics of Latino voter participation from 1990 to 1996 in each of 
the regions of California is roughly the same, which indicates that the forces driving Latino 
voter participation are uniform across the state . 
The parameters of the Latino voter mobilizations of the 1990's are quite clear from the 
analysis we have presented in this section of our paper. First, there were strong increases in 
Latino voter registration and participation in the 1990's. But second, we found that these 
increases are associated with mobilizations largely between 1990-1992 and 1994-1996, which 
occur during presidential election years. The timing of these mobilizations call into question 
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the role of Proposition 187 as the cause of Latino voter mobilization, thus leaving open the 
exact causes of this mobilization and making it difficult to predict whether this mobilization 
will continue in the next series of elections. 
3 Latino Voters, Party Identification and Party Sup-
port 
With this understanding of the trends in Latino voter registration and turnout in hand, we 
now turn our attention to the political attitudes, preferences, and voting behavior of Latino 
voters in the statewide elections from 1990 through 1998. In this analysis we use a wide 
variety of exit polling data, conducted by a variety of media and political groups. Much 
of the exit poll data we use comes from the polls conducted by the Voter Research Service 
(VRS) , a consortium of media groups. We also take advantage of the exit polling of the Los 
Angeles Times (LAT ) , which has made many of their recent exit poll results available to the 
public. Last, we have a unique exit poll which we conducted for the California Secretary of 
State, for our study of the blanket primary in the 1998 primary elections in California. One 
important difference between our 1998 primary exit poll (ANPRG) and the media exit polls 
is that our polling frame was five different Assembly districts across the state; the media 
exit polls were designed to be representative samples of the statewide electorate.2 
However, while the ANPRG exit poll does not utilize a representative statewide sample 
of voters, it does have a unique aspect which we will exploit in this analysis. One of the 
Assembly districts (AD 49) is a heavily Latino district, primarily in eastern Los Angeles. 
Thus, we have a large sample of Latino voters which will give us the opportunity to examine 
the political preferences and attitudes of Latino voters in the June 1998 primary election in 
2The five Assembly districts are AD 9, 49, 53, 61, and 75; a more detailed discussion of this exit poll can 
be found in Alvarez and Nagler 1999. 
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great detail. 
We begin our study of California Latino political attitudes and behavior by examining 
Latino partisanship trends in this decade. Generally, California Latinos are and continue 
to be strongly Democratic in their partisanship, as is clearly revealed in Table 2. Here we 
provide the percentages of Latinos claiming to identify with the Democratic party in each of 
the exit polls we use from 1990 through 1998. 
Table 2 goes here 
But, we see in Table 2 that while most Latinos in California claim Democratic parti­
sanship, the general patterns from 1990 through 1996 do not show any clear sign of either 
increases or decreases in Latino partisanship. The percentages of Latino voters who claim 
to be Democratic were 64% in 1990, 68% in 1992, 66% in 1994, and 62% in 1996. However, 
there does seem to be a jump in Latino voter Democratic affiliation in 1998, since in both 
the LAT and ANPRG exit polls we see these same proportions jump to around 70%. 
A much more detailed analysis of Latino partisanship is contained in Table 3. Here we 
provide successive panels, each of which give the proportions of each racial and ethnic group 
in California, reporting Democratic, Republican, Independent, or other partisan affiliation, 
in each election for which we have exit poll data during the 1990's. 
Table 3 goes here 
For California Latino voters in these elections, we again see the relative stability of 
Democratic partisan identification from 1990-1996, with a jump in Democratic identification 
in 1998. Regarding the other racial and ethnic groups, it is clear that African-Americans are 
locked heavily into the Democratic coalition, with the proportion of African-American voters 
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who identify with the DPrnocratic pa.rty a steady 15-20% higher than Latino identilication 
Asian-Anwricans, on tlw other hand, in 1990 were highly heterogeneous: 45% Democratic 
icl<�ntification, 31 % Republican identification, and 22% Independent. By the 1998 primary 
election, there appears to be a trend in which Asian-American Republicans are either not 
voting in statewide elections or they arc changing their partisan affilations to Independent. 
The ANPRG poll from 1998 has a 45% Democratic, 23% Republican and 30% Indepen­
dent breakdown, while the 1998 LAT primary election exit poll has the Asian-American 
breakdown at 40% Democratic, 8% Republican and 42% Independent. 
Thus, amongst the major racial and ethnic minority groups in California's electorate, 
we see a great deal of stability in African-American identification with the Democratic party 
during the 1990's. We also see that Latinos are predominantely Democratic in affiliation, with 
indications of a slightly increase in Democratic identification in the 1998 primary election. 
However, it is important to realize that there was also an increase in Democratic partisanship 
among whites in 1998. So it would be a mistake to infer that the Democratic party had done 
something to specifically attract Latinos, or that the Republican party had necessarily caused 
lastin gharm to itself among Latinos. But, Latinos are not as heavily Democratic as African­
Americans. Last, a plurality of Asian-Americans are Democratic during most of this period, 
and we do see evidence of a trend of Asian-Americans away from the Republican party into 
Independent status. 
Next, we shift focus to Latino voting behavior. In Table 4 we summarize the major 
patterns in Latino voting behavior for governor, in California since 1990. In this table we 
provide first the estimated proportion of the voting electorate which was made up by Latino 
voters; the second column then gives the proportions of Latino voters casting ballots for 
Democratic gubernatorial candidates. 
Table 4 goes here 
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In the first column of Table 4 we again see some evidence of increasing Latino voter 
participation. Focusing on the midterm elections of 1990, 1994 and 1998, we find that in the 
general election exit polls from those years Latino voters made up 5%, 9%, and 14% of the 
electorate (focusing on either VRS or CNN exit polls) . In the presidential election years of 
1992 and 1996, we see Latino vote shares of 12% and 14% (focusing only on the VRS polls) . 
Thus, we again find evidence of Latinos' increasing share of the state electorate. 
The second column gives the percentages of Latino voters supporting Democratic gu­
bernatorial candidates in each election. In 1990, the VRS general election exit poll reported 
71 % of Latino voter supporting the Democratic candidate (Dianne Feinstein) . This is al­
most identical to the 70% (LAT ) or 71% (CNN) Latino voter support for the Democratic 
candidate (Kathleen Brown) in the 1994 gubernatorial race. But we do see some sign that 
Latino support for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 1998 could have been greater, 
with estimates of 71% (LAT ) or 78% (CNN) . However, comparing the Anglo and Latino 
voting the table again suggests that we do not see long-term Latino specific gains for the 
Democratic party. The ratio of Latino to Anglo support for the Democratic party in 1998 is 
not appreciably greater than it was in 1990. 
We break down the gubernatorial vote in each of these elections for the other major 
racial and ethnic groups in Tables 5. Here we have successive panels in each table giving 
the proportions of each racial and ethnic group supporting the Republican and Democratic 
candidates. 
Table 5 goes here 
The patterns in general election partisan voting for each racial and ethnic group in­
dicate shifting coalitions in each gubernatorial election. In the 1990 gubernatorial elec­
tion, white voters split almost evenly between the Democratic and Republican candidates. 
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African-Americans were strongly Democratic (913) , with Latinos being less Democratic 
(713), and with a majority of Asians casting Democratic ballots. But in 1994, white voters 
shift dramatically into the Republican column (623 in the CNN poll and 593 in the LAT 
poll) , while a majority of Asian-American voters also move into the Republican column. 
African-American support for the Democratic candidate drops considerably to 763, while 
Latino Democratic support is roughly the same as it was in 1990. 
But in 1998, the landscape shifts again, with white voters returning to the Demo­
cratic candidate, giving the Democrats a thin majority amongst white voters in both of the 
exit polls. African-American voters remain strongly Democratic, but still not as strongly 
Democratic in their voting as in 1990. Latinos are also mainly supporting the Democratic 
candidate, with their Democratic voting either being the same as in the preceding elections 
or slighly greater, depending on which of the two exit polls one uses (783 in the CNN poll 
and 713 in the LAT poll) . Asian-Americans, like white voters, though, also in 1998 return 
to the Democratic column. 
We provide similar racial and minority group breakdowns in the 1994 and 1998 guber­
natorial primary elections in Tables 6 and 7. These tables are organized as the preceding 
tables were presented. 
Tables 6 and 7 go here 
The 1994 gubernatorial primary was a "closed" primary, in which voters could only 
cast ballots for candidates running in the party's primary for which they were registered 
to vote. In 1994, Latinos made up 123 of the Democratic primary electorate, and 613 
of these Latino Democrats voted for Kathleen Brown, the eventual Democratic nominee. 
Majorities of all of the other major racial and ethnic groups in the Democratic primary in 
1994 supported Brown as well, but for whites. In the 1994 Republican primary, Latinos 
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made up only 4% of the electorate. Interestingly, these Latino Republicans were closely 
divided between Ron Unz and Pete Wilson. Unz, who would go on in 1998 to sponsor the 
anti-bilingual education initiative Proposition 227, found strong support amongst white and 
latino Republicans, but not enough support to beat the incumbent Wilson. Wilson, who 
later in the 1994 election would become closely associated with Proposition 187, received a 
bare majority of Latino Republican support in 1994. 
The 1998 primary, though, was run under a different set of electoral rules following the 
passage of Proposition 198. The 1998 primary was a "blanket" primary, in which voters could 
cast one vote for any candidate, irregardless of the voter's or candidate's party affiliation. 
Focusing on the CNN and LAT exit polls, we see that Latino voters primarily cast ballots 
in the Democratic primary; only 17% cast ballots for Lungren, the frontrunning Republican 
candidate. Thirty-six percent of Latino voters in these two polls cast ballots for Davis, and 
30% voted for Checchi. Checchi's strong showing in the primary amongst Latino voters is 
consistent with his strong campaigning for the Latino vote. 
The ANPRG exit poll, reported in Table 7, actually shows slightly stronger Checchi 
support than Davis support, in each of the possible categories of Latino, Hispanic, and 
Hispanic-Latino identification. This is no doubt due to the fact that the ANPRG poll was 
conducted in one area (Eastern Los Angeles) , where Checchi heavily courted the Latino vote 
with Spanish language advertising. 
In the end, what can we conclude from the evidence presented in this section of this 
paper? First, we have presented clear evidence that Latino voters are reasonably strong 
in their Democratic partisan affiliation and in their willingness to support Democratic gu­
bernatorial candidates in California. But second, we did find that generally Latino voters 
are not as strong in neither their Democratic affiliations or gubernatorial voting as African­
American voters. Third, there is not strong evidence of a heavy surge of Latino Democratic 
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partisanship nor candidate support; for most of the 1990's Latino voters were relatively sta­
ble in both identification and gubernatorial voting, with some signs of a slightly increase in 
both in the 1998 election. Last, looking only at the 1998 primary election, there is evidence 
that direct targeting of Latino voters though explicit campaign appeals might be a successful 
strategy for future Democratic primary candidates. 
4 Latino Issue Priorities, 1998 
What issues are important to California's Latino voters? Are they interested or concerned 
with issues that are also the focus of white voters? To probe this question further, we present 
in Table 8 the issue priorities for white and Latino voters from the 1998 primary election. The 
ANPRG exit poll included a list of eleven possible important issues, and allowed each voter 
to check up to three of these issues as important. The issues are: improving education; jobs 
and the economy; reducing crime; electing experienced leaders; abortion; bilingual education; 
stopping special interests; health care; the environment; cutting taxes and electing new 
leadership. 
Table 8 goes here 
THe first two columns of the table give the proportion of white and Latino voters 
declaring an issue to be important. The next two columns give the ordinal ranking of 
each issue by each group based on the proportion within the group declaring it to be an 
important issue. Close examination of Table 8 demonstrates that there is a great deal of 
similarity and difference between white and Latino voters in their issue priorities . Generally, 
white voters are quite broad in their issue priorities. At least 253 or more of the white 
electorate thought that improving education, jobs and the economy, reducing crime, bilingual 
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education, stopping special interests, health care, and cutting taxes were important issues to 
them. Of these important issues, white voters were more inclined to see improving education 
and stopping special interests as important than were Latino voters . 
On the other hand, Latino voters are also broad in their issue priorities . At least 25% or 
more of the Latino electorate saw improving education, jobs and the economy, reducing crime, 
bilingual education, health care and cutting taxes as issues of importance to themselves. But 
on four of these issues, Latino voters seemed stronger in their prioritizations of the issues than 
white voters: jobs and the economy ( 40% of Latino voters saw this as an important issue) , 
reducing crime ( 46% of Latino voters saw this as an important issue) , bilingual education 
(39% of Latino voters thought this was an important issue) , and health care (40% of Latino 
voters saw this as an important issue) . 
Perhaps the clearest difference revealed in Table 8 is the relative weight placed on 
crime versus education by white and Latino voters. More Latino voters claimed crime to 
be an important issue than said improving education was an important issue; whereas for 
whites 12% more whites said improving education was important than said reducing crime 
was important. Also apparent is that whereas jobs and the economy was only the fifth most 
important issue for whites, a full 22% below whites' top issue; jobs and the economy was the 
third most important issue for Latinos, only 6% below their top issue of reducing crime. 
In Table 8 we also provide the proportions of white and Latino voters in the ANPRG 
sample who reported voting for or against three of the ballot propositions in the June 1988 
primary election: Proposition 223 ( "Schools spending limits on administration" ) , Proposition 
226 ( "Political contributions by employees, union memberss, and foreign entities" ) , and 
Proposition 227 ( "English language in the public schools" ) . 3 On these three ballot issues we 
3The names in parentheses in the text are the official ballot titles. The ballot summaries of each proposi­
tion follow. Proposition 223: "Prohibits school districts from spending more than five percent of funds from 
all sources for administrative costs. Authorizes fines for failure to comply. Fiscal Impact: Requires school 
districts to reduce administrative costs (as defined by the measure) by up to $700 million. To comply with 
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do see some significant differences in preferences between white and Latino voters. First, 
white voters were seven percent more likely to support the school administrative spending 
limit proposition (223) than were Latino voters, with a majority of Latinos casting "no" 
votes on this ballot item. The differences between whites and Latinos were even more vast 
on Proposition 226 - which would have sharply limited the ability of unions to solicit 
and utilize political contributions from their members. 49% of white voters in the ANPRG 
sample supported this initiative while only 27% of the Latino voters supported the initiative, 
a difference of 22% . 
Last, Proposition 227 targeted bilingual education programs in California's public 
schools. This was seen by many in the Latino community as yet another in a long string 
of ballot initiatives attacking Latino interests, stretching back to Propositions 187 and 209. 
Here the gap between whites and Latinos was wide, with an overwhelming majority of 
whites ( 69%) supporting Proposition 227 while a strong majority of Latinos ( 61 % ) opposed 
Proposition 227. Thus, while we see differences in preferences on these three ballot issues, 
the differences are especially profound on Proposition 225 and 227. 
However, while these bivariate results indicate that Latinos do have distinctive issue 
preferences, it remains to be determined if these distinctive issue preferences hold constant 
when we control for other possible reasons that Latinos might hold different issue preferences 
than whites and other minority groups. To see if Latinos have distinctive issue preferences 
from Anglos, conditioned on their demographic traits, we estimated a series of multivariate 
this requirement, districts could more accurately account for administrative costs, move operations from cen­
tral locations to school sites, and reduce administrative spending." Proposition 226: "Requires employee's 
or union member's permission to withhold wages or union dues for political contributions. Prohibits foreign 
contributions to state and local candidates. Fiscal Impact: Unknown, probably not major, state enforcement 
costs. Additional state costs (up to $2 million annually, one-time costs of $2 million to $5 million) , offset by 
fees, and unknown local government costs for administrative activities, probably offset by fees." Proposition 
227: "Requires all public school instruction be in English, unless parents request otherwise and show cer­
tain circumstances. Provides short-term English immersion programs for children learning English. Funds 
community English instruction. Fiscal Impact: Impacts on individual school districts would depend on how 
schools, parents, and the state respond to the proposition's changes. These impacts could vary significantly 
by district. Total state spending on education, however, probably would not change." 
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models in which we predicted whether Latino voters in the ANPRG sample were more 
likely to rank different issues as important relative to whites controlling for education, age, 
and gender. We estimated this multivariate predictive model for each of the issue priority 
questions in the ANPRG sample. We report the important results from these predictive 
models in Table 9, where we give the difference in probability that a representative Latino, 
Asian, or black voter would have relative to an anglo voter of listing each of the respective 
issue priorities, controlling for the demographic characteristics listed above. 
Table 9 goes here 
Table 9 is organized so that each row presents the results from the predictive mul-
tivariate model for each issue priority in the ANPRG 1998 sample; each column gives the 
predicted probability effect that self-identification with one of these racial or ethnic minor-
ity groups has on whether a representative voter from each group held each issue priority 
relative to anglos.4 
Examination of Table 9 for Latino voters (first column of numbers) shows a number of 
statistically significant results (indicated by the starred entries) . First, Latino voters were 
significantly less likely to believe that improving education was an important issue priority, 
with blacks also being significantly likely to less likely to find this an important issue. Latino 
voters, like blacks again, were more likely than whites to find that jobs and the economy 
was an important issue in early 1998 . Next, Latino voters were also significantly less likely 
to find that stopping special interests was an important issue priority (Asians were even less 
likely to find that stopping special interests was an important issue priority ) . 
The multivariate results for bilingual education show that Latino voters were much 
4Complete results from these multivariate models are available from the authors upon request. Technically 
these results are from a binary probit model. 
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more likely than whites to find it an issue priority � but both blacks and Asians were 
less likely to see bilingual education as an important issue, highlighting one important issue 
cleavage between these three racial or ethnic groups. Latinos were also less likely than anglos 
to see the environment as a significant issue. 
Last, some of the other issues are worth discussing since we find that Latinos did not 
statistically significantly differ from whites and often from the other racial and ethnic groups. 
One of these issues is abortion, where neither Latinos nor blacks were significantly more or 
less likely than whites to find it an important issue; Asians, though, were less likely than 
whites to see abortion as an important issue in the spring of 1998. Also, none of these racial 
or ethnic groups were distinguishable from whites on the issues of health care and reducing 
crime. 
We can take a different look at the differences Latino issue preferences by examining the 
survey marginals from the PPIC Statewide Survey, conducted in May 1998.5 The responses 
in Table 10 are broken down by all respondents and Latino respondents to each issue. 
Table 1 0  goes here 
The first four questions in Table 10 focus on issue priorities for cnme, education, 
transportation and traffice, and population growth. In the PPIC sample, both Latinos 
and all adults see crime as a "big problem" , but the differences between Latinos and all 
respondents are slight. Latinos are somewhat less likely to see education as a "big problem" 
than all respondents in this survey sample, which is also true for transportation and traffic 
issues and population growth. On each of these three issues, the distribution of Latino 
opinion is shifted more to the "not much of a problem" end than the sample of adults. 
5This is a telephone survey of 2008 California adult residents, interviewed from May 1 to May 6, 1998. 
We use this telephone poll due to the fact that it was conducted close to the June 1998 primary, that it 
contains a large sample of Latinos, and since it has excellent issue questions. 
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The next set of issue questions in the PPIC survey cover a range of education, gov­
ernment finance and regulation, and social issues. First, while Latinos are not as likely to 
see education as an important issue relative to adults, Latinos are slightly more in favor of 
tax-funded school vouchers than all adults. Latinos are also much more in favor of more gov­
ernment expenditures and regulation, but not necessarily for environmental causes. When 
we turn to the two social or moral issues included in the PPIC survey - homosexuality and 
abortion - we see there that Latinos are less accepting of homosexuality and are more likely 
that the general sample of adults to support limits on abortion, and even making abortion 
illegal. 
What can we take from these issue priority figures? In the ANPRG results, two 
conclusions can be reached. First, the relative emphases of white and Latino voters are 
similar, but not identical. Latino voters are less likely to be concerned about improving 
education and the power of special interest groups than whites, more likely to be concerned 
about jobs and the economy, reducing crime, health care, and bilingual education than 
whites. Whites and Latinos are equally concerned about cutting taxes. Second, the issues 
which concern Latino voters are generally economic or family issues; their highest concerns 
are with education and bilingual education, jobs and the economy, health care, and reducing 
crime. 
The PPIC survey results reinforce this portrait of Latino issue preferences. We saw in 
the PPIC survey results that Latinos are not as focused on education, but that many Latinos 
do find it an important problem. Specifically, Latinos support tax-funded school vouchers, 
by a large majority. Latinos are in favor of greater government spending and regulation, but 
are more likely to find homosexuality unacceptable and willing to place stricter limits on 
abortion policy. The greater emphasis on crime relative to education by Latinos is striking. 
This may simply be a function of increased exposure to crime because of income and region. 
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These issue priorities and preferences for Latinos in California point to interesting po­
litical dilemmas for the development of a distinct Latino political coalition. For California 
Latinos in the late 1990's defy standard simple categorization into ideological or partisan 
groupings; the issue priorities and preferences of Latinos in California also do not mesh well 
into standard theories of racial or ethnic politics in the United States (DeSipio 1996) . Ad­
ditionally, with this clustering of issue priorities, it is not at all clear that the Democratic 
party in California can maintain a strong grip on the growing Latino vote, nor on Latino 
partisanship. In some respects, Latino voters in California are concerned by issues which ei­
ther are or could easily become Republican-dominated issues, such as cutting taxes, reducing 
crime, or jobs and the economy. On the other hand, Latino voters are worried about some 
issues which the Democratic party could easily take a strong lead on, especially improving 
education, fixing bilingual education, and health care. Last, neither white nor Latino voters 
are concerned greatly about two issues which are closely associated with the Democratic 
party - abortion and the environment. 
5 Latinos and Democratic Partisanship 
While we have covered extensively the overall dimensions of Latino political behavior and 
attitudes during the 1990's in California, what still remains an open question is the exact 
relationship between specific issues and political behavior and attitudes. In this section we 
provide some answers to this open question by using a multivariate model to analyze Latino 
voter partisanship in the June 1998 primary election. 
The motivation for this multivariate modeling analysis is to pin down exactly which 
issues are motivating Latino voters to enter into Democratic partisanship. A comparison of 
the factors motivating Latino voter Democratic partisanship, with white voter Democratic 
partisanship, will then shed considerable light on what issues may be motivating Latinos to 
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enter, or to possibly exit, from the California Democratic party coalition. 
Our analysis is relatively simple. We estimate a simple probit model, with a binary 
dependent variable coded 1 for Democratic partisanship, 0 otherwise (Republican, Indepen­
dent, or Other party) . As predictive variables, we include measures of ideology and the 
voter's perception of the status of the California state economy. We include dummy vari­
ables to indicate whether the voter noted up to three of the following as important issues: 
improving education, jobs and the economy, reducing crime, electing experienced leaders, 
abortion, bilingual education, stopping special interests, health care, and the environment 
(cutting taxes is the excluded or baseline category) . We include binary indicators for support 
of Propositions 223, 226, and 227, as well as measures for female voters, age, and educational 
attainment. 
We present the results from our multivariate model in a form easy to understand 
in Table 11. Instead of presenting the probit model coefficients, we instead present here 
the estimated marginal effects and their standard errors. 6 We present in the first column 
of Table 11 the independent variable names, while in the next three columns we give the 
estimated effects of each independent variable for the full sample of voters, for only white 
voters, and for Latino voters. 
Table 1 1  goes here 
First, for the full sample of voters in the June 1998 exit poll conducted by ANPRG, we 
see a number of factors emerge as statistically significant predictors of Democratic partisan­
ship. First, ideology (with liberal identifiers more likely to be Democrats) , is an important 
predictor of Democratic partisanship. Among the issue priorities, jobs and the econony, 
abortion, stopping special interests and health care each emerge as significant predictors of 
6The actual probit estimates and other information about the model fit are available from the authors. 
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Democratic identification for the full sample of voters : a voter who saw jobs and the econ­
omy, and health care, as important issues is more likely to be Democratic, while a voter who 
saw abortion and stopping special interests as important was less likely to be a Democrat. 
Support for Propositions 226 and 227 worked to make voters less Democratic, while women 
and less educated voters were more likely to be Democratic identifiers. 
In the second column of probit marginal effect estimates are the predicted effects of 
each independent variable for white voters. The results are similar to those for the full 
sample of voters, with three exceptions. First, for white voters, jobs and the economy, and 
stopping special interests, drop out of statistical significance in predicting their Democratic 
identification. Second, the estimated impact of abortion on Democratic partisanship roughly 
doubles for whites relative to the full sample of voters. 
The last column of Table 11 contains the marginal effects for the Latino voters in this 
primary election exit poll sample. There we see a number of differences relative to white 
voters and the full sample of voters. First, the impact of ideological leanings drops about 
in half for Latino voters; while ideology is still a statistically significant predictor of Latino 
Democratic partisanship, it is roughly half the magnitude as for white voters. Second, we 
see that perception of the state of the California state economy is an important predictor 
of Latino Democratic partisanship, with Latino voters who perceived the California state 
economy to be improving as being more likely to be Democratic. This factor does not play an 
important role in white voter Democratic partisanship. Third, the only issue priority which 
factors heavily into Latino Democratic partisanship is the jobs and the economy, with Latino 
voters who saw this to be an important problem more likely to be Democratic. This is in 
sharp contrast to white voter Democratic partisanship, where abortion and health care were 
important predictors of Democratic leanings. Fourth, not a single of the important ballot 
propositions in the June 1998 election significantly predicted Latino Democratic partisanship, 
not even Proposition 227, the anti-bilingual education proposition. 
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Thus, the factors which determined Latino voter Democratic partisanship are clearly 
distinct from those determining white Democratic partisanship in early 1998. Latino voters 
were identifying with the Democratic party much less for ideological reasons, much less 
for positions on divisive ballot propositions, and generally much less for non-economic issue 
reasons. Instead, Latino voters were identifying with the Democratic party primarily because 
of economic reasons. 
6 Has The "Sleeping Giant" Awakened? 
In the final analysis the politically important question about Latinos in California politics 
during the 1990's concerns whether they are mobilizing and voting in ways which are becom­
ing increasingly relevant. In our analysis above, we have discussed three important features 
of Latino political behavior in the 1990's in California. First, we have found evidence of 
widespread Latino voter mobilization in the 1990's, both in terms of increases in Latino 
voter registration and turnout. But while these increases are clear, they are not immediately 
traceable to the salient political events of this decade which pundits assert to be the causes 
of Latino political mobilization in California - Propositions 187, 209 and 227. We find 
no clear sign that any of these proposition campaigns played a direct role in Latino voter 
mobilization during the 1990's. 
Second, while this mobilization has occurred, there has been a striking amount of 
stability in Latino partisan identification and voting behavior. We have shown that there 
has been stable and widespread identification and voting support for the Democratic party 
and it's candidates by Latinos during the 1990's. The only signs we can spot of any deviations 
in the relative stability of Latino affiliations and behavior during this period come in the 1998 
election, where we see slight increases in both Latino Democratic partisanship and support 
for Democratic gubernatorial candidates. 
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Third, when we examined Latino issue priorities in the 1998 election we found a great 
deal of support for a variety of issues by Latino voters, but especially for issues which focus 
on economics and the family. The relative prioritization by Latinos of these issues is stronger 
than for white voters in California; also, there are some issues which whites find important 
which Latino voters do not. This shows that the Latino electorate has different issue priorities 
than the larger white electorate, which points to inherent difficulties for any political actor 
striving to construct a coalition from Latino and white voters in future California elections. 
Last, when we examined Latino voters in contrast not only with white voters, but 
also with African-American and Asian-American voters, we found that there are interesting 
differences in the political affiliations and behaviors of each racial or ethnic group. While 
African-American voters are still strongly wedded to the Democratic party in California, we 
saw that Asian-American voters are much less oriented towards the Democrats and much 
less likely to support Democratic candidates than African-Americans. Latinos, interestingly, 
fall in between these other two racial and ethnic groups in their propensity to support the 
Democratic party in terms of both affiliation and voting behavior. 
To us, this indicates that the increasing role of Latino voters in California politics 
will not necessarily continue to help the Democratic party. Currently, Latinos are iden­
tifying with the Democratic party and voting for Democratic candidates, but unless the 
Democratic party begins to develop much more explicit reasons for Latinos to continue their 
Democratic support, it is by no means clear that Latinos will stay with the Democratic 
party in future election cycles. Since the issue preferences of Latino voters are distinct from 
the issue preferences of other racial and ethnic voter groups in California, and since the 
issue preferences of Latino voters do not fit neatly within the current issue stances of the 
Democratic or Republican party, it is difficult to predict which party (if any) will capture 
the Latino electorate in future California elections. 
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Table 1: Latino Voter Registration and Turnout, 1990-�1996 
Lat ino Voter Registration 
Region 1990 1992 1994 1996 
California .52 .61 .60 .67 
Southern .54 .62 .60 .66 
Bay Area .53 .65 .61 .87 
Central Coast .55 .69 .65 .74 
Central Valley .50 .55 .59 .63 
Mountains .52 .60 .61  .66 
Northern .50 .58 .58 .65 
Los Angeles Co. .60 .65 .63 .68 
Overall Statewide Voter Registration 
California . 70 . 72 . 78 .80 
Lat ino Voter Turnout 
Region 1990 1992 1994 1996 
California .29 .57 .43 .52 
Southern .25 .57 .43 .50 
Bay Area .23 .56 .40 .51 
Central Coast .34 .60 .46 .54 
Central Valley .24 .54 .40 .50 
Mountains .32 .58 .45 .53 
Northern .33 .57 .45 .52 
Los Angeles Co. .29 .61 .44 .54 
Overall Statewide Voter Turnout 
California .41 .55 .47 .53 
Note: Source for the entries on Latinos in this table is Alvarez and 
Butterfield 1999 .  Entries in the first part of the table are proportion of 
Latino persons of voting age who are registered; entries in the second 
part of the table are the proportion of voting age Latinos who voted 
in each election. The overall statewide voter registration rates and 
turnout rates are from the Statement of Vote prepared by the office of 
the Secretary of State, California. 
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Table 2: Latinos and Partisanship, 1990-1998 
Democratic Identification 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1998 
General General General 
Ethnic Identification (VRS) (VRS) (V RS) 
Hispanic-Latino 64 68 66 
Latino 
Hispanic 
28 
General 
(VRS) 
62 
Primary 
(ANPRG) 
70 
75 
68 
Primary 
(LAT) 
74 
Table 3: Race, Ethnicity and Partisanship, 1990-1998 
Partisan Identification 
Ethnic Identification Democrat Republican Independent Other Total 
1 9 9 0  General Elect ion, VRS 
White 39 39 18 4 76 
Black 81 8 7 4 15 
Hispanic-Latino 64 20 13 3 5 
Asian 45 31 22 2 3 
Other 50 16 18 16 1 
1 99 2  General Elect ion, VRS 
White 40 36 19 6 72 
Black 83 5 9 2 11 
Hispanic-Latino 68 15 12 5 12 
Asian 40 33 18 10 3 
Other 53 18 18 13 2 
1 994 General Elect ion, VRS 
White 36 44 15 5 76 
Black 80 9 8 4 9 
Hispanic-Latino 66 17 13 4 10 
Asian 44 37 17 2 4 
Other 48 20 24 8 2 
1 99 6  General Elect ion, VRS 
White 40 38 16 6 70 
Black 73 11 9 6 10 
Hispanic-Latino 62 21 11 6 14 
Asian 35 46 14 6 4 
Other 48 23 16 13 2 
1 9 9 8  Primary Elect ion, ANPRG 
White 38 30 29 3 62 
Black 82 7 5 6 5 
Latino 75 12 11 2 9 
Hispanic 68 13 16 3 15 
Hispanic-Latino 70 13 14 3 23 
Asian 45 23 30 2 8 
Other 46 19 24 10 2 
1 99 8  Primary Elect ion, LAT 
White 45 5 44 6 76 
Black 80 8 5 6 7 
Latino 74 5 16 4 10 
Asian 40 8 42 10 4 
Other 53 14 23 10 3 
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Table 4: Latino Vote Share and Democratic Support, 1990-1998 
Election and Poll 
Hispanic-Latino 
Vote Share 
1990 General, VRS 5 
1992 General, VRS 12 
1994 Dem. Primary, LAT 12 
1994 Rep. Primary, LAT 4 
1994 General, LAT 9 
1994 General, CNN 9 
1996 General, VRS 14 
Hispanic-Latino 
Democratic Governor 
Support 
71 
70 
71 
1998 Primary, LAT 12 83 
1998 Primary, CNN 12 83 
1998 Primary, ANPRGa 27 85 
Anglo 
Democratic Governor 
Support 
51 
36 
33 
1998 General , LAT 13 71 51 
1998 General, CNN 14 78 50 
aThe ANPRG poll is not a statewide random sample; so the vote share is not a 
relevant number; however the proportion voting Democratic is relevant. 
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Table 5: Race, Ethnicity, and Gubernatorial Voting 1990-1998 
Race and Ethnicity Democratic Vote Republican Vote Vote Share 
White 
Black 
Hispanic-Latino 
Asian 
Other 
White 
Black 
Hispanic-Latino 
Asian 
Other 
White 
Black 
Latino 
Asian 
Other 
White 
Black 
Hispanic-Latino 
Asian 
Other 
White 
Black 
Latino 
Asian 
1 9 9 0  General Election, VRS 
51 49 
91 9 
71 29 
56 44 
54 46 
1 994 General Election, CNN 
33 62 
76 
71 
45 
20 
27 
54 
1994 General Elect ion, LAT 
36 59 
76 22 
70 
44 
42 
25 
52 
50 
1 998 General Election, CNN 
50 46 
83 
78 
67 
11 
17 
29 
1 998 General Election, LAT 
51 45 
76 22 
71 23 
65 35 
31 
75 
16 
5 
3 
1 
77 
8 
9 
4 
2 
81 
6 
9 
4 
1 
74 
7 
14 
4 
2 
64 
13 
13 
8 
Table 6: Race, Ethnicity and the 1994 Gubernatorial Primary 
Race and Ethnicity 
White 
Black 
Latino 
Asian 
Native American 
White 
Black 
Latino 
Asian 
Brown 
48 
76 
61 
52 
57 
Unz 
41 
31 
49 
27 
Democratic Primary 
Garamendi Hayden Vote Share 
34 18 72 
19 5 8 
32 7 12 
36 11 4 
33 10 1 
Republican Primary 
Wilson Total 
59 89 
69 1 
51 4 
73 4 
Native American 33 67 1 
Note: Data from Los Angeles Times Exit Poll. 
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Table 7: Race, Ethnicity and the 1998 Gubernatorial Primary 
Race and Ethnicity Checchi Davis Harman Lungren Vote Share 
CNN 
White 9 30 11 43 69 
Black 17 53 17 9 14 
Hispanic-Latino 30 36 11 17 12 
Asian 14 36 10 39 3 
LAT 
White 9 30 11 43 69 
Black 17 53 17 9 14 
Latino 30 36 11 17 12 
Asian 14 36 10 39 3 
ANPRG 
White 12 30 13 41 62 
Black 19 51 18 5 5 
Latino 40 36 12 7 9 
Hispanic 36 34 12 12 15 
Hispanic-Latino 38 35 12 10 27 
Asian 17 37 11 28 8 
Native American 16 28 10 39 2 
Other 22 31 9 18 2 
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Table 8: Issue Priorities and Preferences for Whites and Latinos, ANPRG June 1998 
Proportion of Respondents Ordinal Ranking 
Issue Priority 
Improving Education 
Jobs and the Economy 
Reducing Crime 
Electing Experienced Leaders 
Abortion 
Bilingual Education 
Stopping Special Interests 
Health Care 
Environment 
Cutting Taxes 
New Leadership 
Issue Preferences 
Prop. 223 - Yes 
Prop. 223 - No 
Prop. 226 - Yes 
Prop. 226 - No 
Prop. 227 - Yes 
Prop. 227 - No 
Note: Source, ANPRG 1998 
Listing Issue as Important of Issue 
White Latino White Latino 
52 45 1 2 
30 40 5 3 
@ � 2 1 
18 13 9 9 
11 11 11 11 
28 39 7 5 
29 19 6 7 
31 40 4 3 
16 13 10 9 
34 34 3 6 
20 19 8 7 
52 45 
48 55 
49 27 
51 73 
69 39 
31 61 
Column entries in the top of the table are the proportion of White and Latino voters indicat­
ing they consider an issue important, when asked to identify up to three issues as important 
from the entire list. 
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Table 9: Multivariate Analysis: 
Issue Priority 
Race, Ethnicity, and Issue Preferences 
Latinos Blacks Asians 
Improving Education 
Jobs and the Economy 
Reducing Crime 
Electing Experienced Leaders 
Abortion 
Bilingual Education 
Stopping Special Interests 
Health Care 
Environment 
Cutting Taxes 
Electing New Leaders 
-.04* -.15**  -.07* 
.07**  .18**  -.04 
.01 .01 -.01 
-.02 -.01 -.03 
-.01 
.15**  
-.07**  
.05**  
- .04**  
-.04* 
-.00 
-.01 
-.09**  
-.08 
.08**  
.05 
.00 
.02 
-.05** 
-.05 
-.08**  
.09**  
-.03 
.00 
-.02 
Each table entry is the estimated impact of respondent's ethnicity on 
the probability of listing the entry listed on each row as one of the most 
important issues. Estimates come from a probit model controlling for 
respondent's age, education, and gender (impact computed with other 
variables set to their mean) . 
* indicates estimate significant at .10 level. 
* *  indicates estimate significant at .05 level. 
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Table 10: Issue Priorities for Latinos, PPIC May 1998 
Racial or Ethnic Group 
Issue Priority Adults Latino 
Crime 
Big Problem 
Somewhat of a Problem 
Not Much of a Pro bl em 
Don't Know 
Quality of K-12 Education 
Big Problem 
Somewhat of a Problem 
Not Much of a Problem 
Don't Know 
Transportation-Traffic 
Big Problem 
Somewhat of a Problem 
Not a Problem 
Don't Know 
Population Growth-Development 
Big Problem 
Somewhat of a Problem 
Not a Problem 
Don't Know 
Tax-funded School Vouchers 
Favor 
Oppose 
Don't Know 
Reduce Taxes , Spend More 
Spend More, Raise Taxes 
Gov't Regulation Needed 
Gov 't Regulation Harmful 
Stricter Env. Regulation Needed 
Stricter Env. Regulation Costly 
Homosexuality Acceptable 
Homosexuality Unacceptable 
Abortion left to woman and doctor 
Abortion Should be Limited 
Abortion Should be Illegal 
Note: Source, PPIC May 1998 
36 
66 62 
28 24 
4 5 
2 9 
46 36 
33 34 
14 26 
7 4 
33 27 
35 33 
31 38 
1 2 
27 21 
38 38 
34 39 
1 2 
58 63 
37 31 
5 6 
44 38 
51 58 
54 63 
43 33 
58 52 
37 41 
55 58 
40 37 
61 42 
26 37 
12 21 
Table 11: Determinants of Democratic Partisanship, June 1998 
Independent Variable All Voters Whites Latinos 
Ideology -.18**  -.19**  -.09**  
.01 .02 .02 
Cal. Economy -.009 .02 -.06**  
.01 .02 .03 
Improving Education .02 .03 .01 
.03 .03 .05 
Jobs and the Economy .09**  .03 .10**  
.03 .03 .05 
Reducing Crime .008 -.007 .02 
.03 .03 .05 
Electing Experienced Leaders .01 .05 .02 
.03 .04 .07 
Abortion -.07* -.13**  -.02 
.04 .04 .08 
Bilingual Education .03 .03 .04 
.03 .03 .05 
Stopping Special Interests -.05* -.02 -.09 
.03 .03 .06 
Health Care .10**  .11 **  .08 
.03 .03 .05 
Environment -.003 .02 -.02 
.04 .04 .07 
Proposition 223 .02 .03 -.04 
.03 .03 .05 
Proposition 226 -.13**  -.13**  -.04 
.03 .04 .08 
Proposition 227 -.18**  -.17**  -.09 
.03 .04 .06 
Female .05* .08**  .04 
.03 .03 .05 
Age .01 .004 .04 
.01 .02 .02 
Education -.06**  -.04**  -.06**  
.01 .01 .02 
Sample size 1935 1246 404 
Note: Entries are estimates of the magnitudes of the impact of each variable on the 
probability of Democratic partisanship. 
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